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CHAPTER NINE
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF AUTONOMY
Antti Kauppinen
The ideology of atomistic individualism is a pervasive and familiar 
feature of late capitalist modernity. The following quote from a best-
selling self-help book may serve as a graphic illustration:
You must recognize that you alone are the source of all the conditions 
and situations in your life. You must recognize that whatever your world 
looks like right now, you alone have caused it to look that way. The state 
of your health, your finances, your personal relationships – all of it is 
your doing, yours and no one else’s.1
There is a kind of appeal to this sort of thinking. We take pride in being 
independent thinkers and doers, and we want to feel we are in control 
of our lives. We believe in personal responsibility, in blaming and 
praising people for actions that are up to them. Yet the injunction to 
shoulder all responsibility for everything is manifestly absurd. Surely 
our powers of controlling our lives are not magical. It is common sense 
that we acquire and exercise our capacities for self-determination and 
autonomy in interaction with others. The kind of animals we are do 
not spring out of the earth like mushrooms; it is ridiculous to suggest 
that there are no social conditions for autonomous lives. This is no 
doubt a truism. However, it gives rise to a real challenge: just what kind 
of social relationships are compatible with – or perhaps even necessary 
for – autonomous agency? If and when we value autonomy and wish to 
promote it, what should we do, beyond granting people rights against 
interference?
Traditional philosophical accounts of autonomy have focused on 
the capacities and characteristics of individuals that are required for 
them to count as self-determining and responsible, paying little heed 
to social conditions that might be harmful or conducive to acquiring 
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or exercising these capacities. Recoiling from such views, those who 
emphasise how social power relations shape our very identities and 
how unconscious drives guide our behaviour have sometimes claimed 
that autonomy is just a harmful fiction: there is no real self, and even if 
there were one, it would not be in control. Nonetheless, even these 
radicals sign their works and speak of resistance, suggesting that their 
real beef is not with autonomy itself but more likely particular, indi-
vidualistic conceptions of it. Perhaps it is not necessary, however, to 
conceive autonomy like that. Perhaps we can think of authentic self-
determination as an intersubjective achievement, and thus avoid both 
unrealistic atomism and social determinism. This alternative has 
become a central starting point in recent debates in political philoso-
phy around communitarianism, feminism and critical theory.
In this essay, I will examine systematically what a social or relational 
or intersubjectivist conception of autonomy might look like, what it 
would add to individualist theories, and what normative consequences 
it would have for liberal political philosophy. I begin with a brief look 
at the concept of autonomy and leading contemporary individualist 
theories (1). I then distinguish three respects in which autonomous 
agency depends on a sufficiently conducive social environment. First, 
as communitarians, feminists and psychoanalytically inspired philoso-
phers have convincingly shown, acquiring the evaluative and motiva-
tional capacities needed for authentic self-determination is a result of 
a socialisation process that enables the child to grasp distinctions in 
value, challenge prevailing conventions, and order its first-order 
desires accordingly (2). As this literature is already well known and 
much discussed, I will be content with a brief overview. However, the 
second kind of intersubjective condition for autonomy, the psychologi-
cal conditions for exercising these capacities and skills to shape an 
authentic self and lead an autonomous life, are less familiar. As Axel 
Honneth, above all, has argued, without a positive set of attitudes 
toward oneself – self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem – one 
will not be able to make use of one’s autonomy-constituting capacities. 
The development of these second-order capacities for autonomy, as 
they might be called, requires interpersonal recognition as a matter of 
empirical fact (3). I argue, however, that Honneth’s view, as it stands, 
suffers from two basic weaknesses. First, it is premised on a problem-
atic conception of the role of desire in autonomous agency, and needs 
to be supplemented by a normative competence account of individual 
autonomy capacities (4). Second, since the significance of recognition 
for autonomy is mediated through subjective experience, it cannot 
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account for cases in which the exercise of autonomy-constituting 
capacities is hindered by objective relations of domination that are not 
experienced as such. Thus I argue for adding a third kind of intersub-
jective condition for autonomy, according to which having a social 
standing that makes available participation in valuable activities – a 
standing defined by the absence of domination, marginalisation and 
emotional exclusion – is directly constitutive of being autonomous, 
since it is, together with competitive material resources, the external 
condition of exercising effective autonomous control over one’s life (5). 
In short, I argue that the exercise of autonomy-constituting individual 
capacities requires what Hegel calls ‘being at home’ in the social world, 
a condition that involves both the subjective experience of recognition 
and the objective fact of recognition. Such a strongly intersubjective 
view has potentially wide-ranging implications for a political theory 
like liberalism that takes individual autonomy as a central focus (6).
1. The Concept and Conceptions of Autonomy
Autonomy is a theoretical concept, though it has by now acquired 
some everyday resonance. Still, unlike the case of an ordinary language 
concept like knowledge, there is no point comparing theoretical pro-
posals with ordinary use or linguistic intuitions. We can assess whether 
one or another way to understand it is better only in terms of a fixed 
theoretical purpose. In other words, we must fix the theoretical role of 
autonomy to pass judgement on different accounts of what it takes to 
fulfil that role. My topic in this essay is personal autonomy, which is, in 
the first instance, a characteristic of some persons or agents, rather 
than particular choices, actions or motives – even if the best way to 
approach what makes agents autonomous may be through investigat-
ing conditions for autonomous choice or action. Though it is intimately 
related to moral autonomy – roughly, the ability to govern oneself 
according to moral principles – and political autonomy – the ability to 
take part in collective-will formation – it is conceptually distinct.
I will approach the distinctive theoretical role of autonomy in terms 
of three widely accepted main contrasts that define what philosophers 
in general talk about when they talk about (personal) autonomy.2 First, 
autonomy contrasts with mechanism; an autonomous action does not 
2 In arguing that there is a unitary, commonly accepted core to the concept of (per-
sonal) autonomy (as opposed to conceptions of it), I am rejecting the view that there is 
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a plurality of distinct notions that are often confused. Nomy Arpaly, for example, dis-
tinguishes eight “senses” of “autonomy” (N. Arpaly, Unprincipled Virtue, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 117–130), but fails to see that the central ones are 
aspects of a single notion rather than distinct, as she claims.
3 At this level of abstraction one must naturally be careful not to formulate authen-
ticity and self-determination in terms that presuppose an individualist conception of 
autonomy.
4 G. Watson, 1996, S. Wolf, Freedom within Reason, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1990.
follow from earlier states of affairs like clockwork or a pre-programmed 
reaction. If there is causal determination, it must be of a distinctive 
kind that allows for conscious, goal-seeking behaviour. Second, auton-
omy contrasts with lack of self-control due to volitional or motivational 
disorders. Autonomous agents are not constantly driven by random 
urges, desires or rash judgements, but are in some sense in charge of 
themselves. And finally, autonomy contrasts with heteronomy, by 
which I mean here that one’s conception of what is worth doing does 
not result from undue influence by others (or physiological failure) but 
is rather a response to considerations bearing on the issue.
These contrasts highlight, respectively, the elements of purposive 
agency, self-determination and authenticity that are essential to any rec-
ognisable notion of autonomy.3 Agents whose actions are not governed 
by simple mechanism, alien motives or heteronomous influence but 
are instead authentically self-determining can meaningfully count as 
authors of their own actions and co-authors of their own lives when 
they are able to consistently exercise this capacity. This has several con-
sequences to how it makes sense for others to relate to them. First, 
autonomous actions reveal who the agent is. They are, as Susan Wolf 
and Gary Watson put it, deeply attributable to the agent.4 They disclose 
the agent’s character to others, expressing her practical identity. Since 
autonomous actions flow from the agent’s own commitments, she can 
meaningfully be held answerable for them. Second, since autonomous 
agents are capable of forming views on what is worth doing in light of 
pertinent considerations and acting on them, it is fair to hold them to 
behavioural expectations that could in principle be justified to them. 
In other words, they are fit to be held fully responsible for their actions. 
It makes sense to praise or blame them for their actions, as well as to 
engage in practical dialogue with them to convince them. Third, when 
autonomous agents exercise the abilities that make them fit to be held 
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5 For the connection between fitness to be held responsible and freedom, see 
P. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment” in G. Watson, Free Will, 2nd ed., Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 72–93 and in P. Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, 
Cambridge, Polity Press, ch. 1, 2001.
6 See the essays collected in H. Frankfurt, The Importance of What We Care About, 
1988 and G. Dworkin, Theory and Practice of Autonomy, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1988.
responsible, they are in an important sense free.5 As free and responsi-
ble, these agents are entitled not only to full moral consideration but 
also to a say in how they should be treated by others. Because auton-
omy is essential for full participation in public deliberation, it is a cen-
tral democratic value. Because it is essential to leading one’s life 
according to one’s own convictions, it is a central liberal value.
What, then, constitutes being autonomous? According to individu-
alist conceptions, being autonomous is solely a matter of having certain 
kinds of psychological capacities. Contemporary individualists can be 
divided into two basic groups, proceduralists and substantivists. 
Procedural views are content-neutral: according to them, any prefer-
ence can count as autonomous, provided it is formed in the right way 
or fits in the right way in the agent’s motivational structure. Thus, 
according to hierarchical theories of Harry Frankfurt and Gerald 
Dworkin, our standpoint on the world is constituted by the desires that 
we reflectively endorse. For them, reflective endorsement is a matter of, 
roughly, desiring to desire as one does.6 A world-directed or first-order 
desire is autonomous if the agent has a suitable second-order desire 
(a desire about desires) to the effect that the first-order desire be moti-
vationally effective. In such a case, the agent is said to identify with the 
first-order desire, which thus constitutes her will. Desires that we do 
not desire to have, in contrast, are in the relevant sense external to 
ourselves; we are alienated from them, and if they lead us to act in spite 
of ourselves, we are mere bystanders to our own actions.
Critics of the hierarchical model within the proceduralist tradition 
have focused on two questions: are higher-order desires really suitable 
for drawing the limits of the agent’s real self, and is the origin of higher-
order desires really irrelevant to autonomy? To begin with, why is it 
that higher-order desires should count as somehow representing the 
agent’s own view or her real self – what gives them such authority? 
There is no guarantee, notably, that higher-order desires represent our 
values: we might intelligibly disapprove of them, and thus, arguably, 
alienate ourselves from them. To solve this problem, evaluativists like 
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    7 G. Watson, “Free Agency” (1975) in G. Watson, Agency and Answerability. 
Selected Essays, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2004, pp. 25–26; he calls the view “Platonistic”. 
Frankfurt’s talk of “reflective endorsement” is also sometimes construed as a version of 
evaluativism (for example, M. Smith, The Moral Problem, Oxford, Blackwell, 1994, 
p. 134), but he vehemently denies this, emphasising volitional necessity (inability and 
unwillingness to will otherwise) as the criterion of desire ownership in recent work 
(see H. Frankfurt, The Reasons of Love, Princetown University Press, 2004).
    8 J. Christman, “Autonomy and Personal History,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 
vol. 21, no. 1, 1991, pp. 9n19.
    9 ibid., p. 21. Robert Young’s account (“Autonomy and Socialization,” Mind, vol. 89, 
1980, pp. 565–576) differs in that for him, reflective acceptance now of the processes 
that led to preference-formation or identification is sufficient for autonomy, while 
Christman requires reflective acceptance then, to avoid the problem that acceptance 
now can be objectionably conditioned.
10 A. Mele, Autonomous Agents, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995, 
pp. 168–172, 183–184.
Gary Watson, roughly propose that we see the agent’s own standpoint 
or true self as constituted by her valuational system or evaluative 
beliefs.7 Autonomy as self-determination, then, is achieved when the 
agent’s motivational system or desires is aligned with her valuational 
system. However, this still leaves the problem of origin open: if we 
admit that it is possible to get agents to form desires that do not repre-
sent their true self, why would it not be possible to get agents to form 
inauthentic higher-order desires or evaluations? As John Christman 
puts it, “a person can be manipulated and conditioned to such an 
extent that she gains a coherent and integrated set of desires as a result, 
but one which is totally the result of external manipulation”.8 Thus, 
Christman proposes that autonomous desires are those resulting from 
a process that the agent would not have resisted, had she reflected on 
them in a minimally rational and self-aware fashion.9 In a similar 
spirit, but building on an evaluativist rather than hierarchical model, 
Al Mele suggests that what makes ‘value engineering’ autonomy under-
mining is that it bypasses the agent’s capacities for rational control of 
their mental lives, such as those of assessing their values and principles 
and modifying their motives accordingly.10
The essence of all the above procedural individualist views is that 
the content of an autonomous agent’s evaluative beliefs and desires 
does not matter. Some find this problematic since it allows one to 
autonomously choose a life of subservience and non-autonomy, for 
example. Consequently, they argue that there are certain specific things 
that an autonomous person must care about, centrally continuing to be 
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11 See, for example, T. Hill, “Servility and Self-Respect” in Autonomy and Self-
Respect, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. ?. See also M. Oshana, 
“Personal Autonomy and Society,” The Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 29, no. 1, 1998, 
pp. 81–102.
12 Wolf 1990, R. J. Wallace (Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments, Cambridge, 
Mass., Harvard University Press, 1994), Fischer and Ravizza 1998. Wolf herself (and 
Wallace after her) use ‘autonomy’ for the sort of Kantian views requiring contracausal 
freedom that she rejects, but it makes more sense to see her ‘Reason View’ as an alter-
native conception of autonomy rather than as an alternative to autonomy. Similarly, 
Pettit and Smith (1996) (“Freedom in Belief and Desire,” reprinted in Watson, 2003, 
pp. 388–407) use the term “orthonomy” for their normative competence account, 
which I class here as another variant of this conception of autonomy.
13 J. G. Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right, ed. F. Neuhouser, trans. M. Baur, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1796/2000, §1.
autonomous in the future.11 Another critique of pure proceduralism 
takes its departure from the link between autonomy and accountabil-
ity, or fitness to be held fully responsible. The key idea is that it is pos-
sible to meet any procedural conditions, but still be intuitively less than 
fully accountable for one’s choices. This is the case when one’s values or 
desires lack sufficient grounding in what is truly valuable or desirable. 
Such agents may be self-governing in a narrow sense, even minimally 
rational in the sense of internal consistency, but still incapable of 
responsibly directing their lives, because they fail to understand the 
true significance of their choices. According to normative competence 
accounts of the sort defended by Susan Wolf, and John Fischer and 
Mark Ravizza, unless the content of one’s evaluative beliefs and desires 
is at least moderately ‘reasons-responsive’, one does not have the kind 
of abilities that would enable one to guide one’s life in a responsible 
manner, and correspondingly are not autonomous.12 I will defend this 
kind of view of autonomy-constituting capacities in section 4.
2. The Social Conditions of Becoming Autonomous
The roots of intersubjectivism can be found already in Aristotle’s doc-
trine that man is a political animal – an animal, that is, whose species-
specific potential is actualised only in and through active participation 
in the life of the polis – and, as we will see, this type of argument is still 
used by some contemporary communitarians. It was Fichte, however, 
who first explicitly formulated an intersubjective condition specifically 
for autonomy, or “the exercise of free efficacy”,13 in his Foundations of 
Natural Right. His argument is a transcendental, a priori deduction 
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14 “[T]he nature of an object is such that, when it is comprehended by a subject, the 
subject’s free activity is posited as constrained.” Fichte, 1796/2000, §3, p. 31. For the 
idealist, the object is still transcendentally (and from the perspective of the philoso-
pher in the theoretical mode) a result of the subject’s free activity, as is everything that 
exists.
15 ibid., §3, p. 31.
16 ibid.
from the conditions of possibility of self-consciousness, which in turn 
is necessary for free choice. It goes roughly as follows. To will anything, 
I must posit (be conscious of) an independent, external world, since 
acting otherwise would be superfluous (everything would change if 
I merely thought so). To posit something as an object is to experience 
it as something that constrains my spontaneity.14 As a practical subject, 
I must thus experience myself as a finite individual. To set ends and 
make plans, to deliberate consciously, I must also be aware of my 
unconstrained ability to set an aim for myself and act on it, my free 
efficacy. This kind of practical self-consciousness requires that “the 
subject’s efficacy is itself the object that is perceived and compre-
hended”.15 But how can I experience my spontaneous activity as such, 
as unconstrained, if at the very moment I make it an object I (by defini-
tion) experience it as something that constrains my spontaneity? That 
is, how can I catch myself in the act, so that the I that is experienced 
and the I that experiences fall together? An infinite regress or circle 
threatens when the I chases its tail in vain. Fichte argues that it is pos-
sible to break the circle only if I am conscious of “being-determined to 
be self-determining”16 – when the object that constrains my spontane-
ity indirectly reveals the spontaneity, allowing me to catch it from the 
corner of my eye, so to speak. Crucially, he notes that this is the case 
when I experience myself as being called on or summoned to act by 
another free and rational subject. When I experience something as a 
summons (Aufforderung), I do not experience it as a causal force that 
determines me to act in a certain way, but as a demand addressed to 
me that calls on me to decide whether or not to go along, that is, to 
determine myself, to exercise my spontaneity. Only in and through this 
reaction of the other to me do I become aware of my spontaneous abil-
ity to act as such, he claims.
Now, Fichte continues, the summoner must take me to be a free 
rational being to try to influence me in this way: “The purposiveness of 
the summons is conditional on the understanding and freedom of the 
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17 ibid., §3, p. 35.
18 ibid., §4, p. 42. Fichte draws the conclusion that since we all need other human 
beings to become human, “if there are human beings, there must be more than one” 
(§3, p. 37). How does it all get started, then? Well, another, non-human rational being 
must have brought up the first human beings (§3, p. 38) – that is, Fichte turns a ‘prim-
ing problem’ for his theory into a proof of the existence of God!
19 A. Honneth, “Die transzendentale Notwendigkeit von Intersubjektivität” in 
Unsichtbarkeit. Stationen einer Theorie der Intersubjektivität. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 
2003, pp. 28–48.; J. Habermas (“Individuation Through Socialization: On George 
Herbert Mead’s Theory of Subjectivity” in Postmetaphysical Thinking, Cambridge, 
Mass., MIT Press, 1992a, pp. 149–204), and R. Neuhouser (“Introduction” in Fichte, 
2000), for example, raise serious concerns about the consistency and sufficiency of 
Fichte’s account. How do I recognise that I am being summoned, if I am not already in 
some inchoate way aware of myself? (At most, intersubjectivity is a condition of the 
move from a pre-reflexive to reflexive awareness of oneself – which is not nothing, of 
course.) How can my transcendental ego be in any sense the source of everything that 
exists, as idealists like Fichte claim, if there must be others?
being to whom it is addressed”.17 To be able to do this, the summoner 
him/herself must have the concepts of freedom and reason, and thus 
be a rational being. Seeing that it issues from a free and rational being 
is thus part of what I have to recognise to take the summons as such – 
and reach self-consciousness – so that recognising a free and rational 
being outside myself is necessary for me to reach self-consciousness. 
Since the summoner must do likewise as a precondition of his very act, 
the recognition as free and rational is necessarily mutual: “One cannot 
recognize the other if both do not mutually recognize each other; and 
one cannot treat the other as a free being, if both do not mutually treat 
each other as free”.18 In this way, mutual recognition and limitation of 
freedom (which, according to Fichte, is the essence of the concept of 
right) turn out to be necessary conditions of self-consciousness (con-
sciousness of one’s free efficacy) and consequently autonomy.
Fichte’s theory is groundbreaking in many ways. It problematises 
something that seems self-evident – my awareness of my own freedom 
to act – and argues that it depends on a linguistically mediated inter-
subjective relationship, thus decisively (even if not necessarily consist-
ently19) breaking the frame of the early modern philosophy of the 
subject. In so doing, it opens a path along which Hegel, Mead and 
Habermas have each achieved their most important insights. 
Nonetheless, even taken at face value, it is very limited as an intersub-
jective theory of autonomous agency. While awareness of one’s ability 
to set ends may be a necessary condition of autonomy, it is far from 
sufficient, as the discussion of individualist conceptions showed.
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20 C. Taylor, Hegel, 1977, pp. 29–30.
21 Sandel, 1998, pp. 159–160; C. Taylor, Human Agency and Language. Philosophical 
Papers I., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985a, pp. 25–26.
22 Sandel, 1998, pp. 58–59; Taylor, Human Agency and Language, p. 34; C. Taylor, 
Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern Identity, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 1989, p. 27.
23 See, for example, A. MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed., Notre Dame, University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1984, pp. 220–221.
Some contemporary communitarians aim to provide a more far-
reaching account of the social conditions for becoming autonomous. 
The basic elements of a generic conception of embedded autonomy 
can be found in the work of Charles Taylor and Michael Sandel. First, 
we can revise our ends only when holding other ends fixed; Taylor 
argues that ‘radical choice’ is no choice at all, just plumping for one or 
another alternative without grounds.20 Second, not just any given ends 
provide support for autonomous choice, since it is not a matter of sim-
ple weighing of the strength of one’s desires.21 Instead, thirdly, autono-
mous choice is choice in light of one’s constitutive ends (Sandel) or 
strong evaluations (Taylor), commitments and valuations that define 
who we are and want to be and make possible qualitative distinctions 
among motives – for example, resisting a temptation to have one’s nose 
operated on because it would be vain, even if one believes this course 
of action would best satisfy one’s existing desires. Thus it calls for self-
knowledge and self-understanding – we must know which of our ends 
are revisable and which are such that stepping back from them would 
amount to becoming a different person.22
Finally, this brings in community in two ways. Since our identity, in 
part, precedes autonomous choice rather than results from it, we can 
only become autonomous when we have a sense of where we stand, an 
orientation toward the good. At least initially, this orientation is 
provided by communally defined roles (being a Catholic, being a 
father, and so on) that involve definite ideals of what is noble and what 
is base, what is worth wanting and what is not.23 These identities may 
be essentially shared, so that it does not make sense to be a nun, for 
example, except in the context of an ongoing social practice. However, 
as Taylor, in particular, emphasises, community does not enter the pic-
ture merely through providing content for identities, but also through 
being a precondition for having a language in which to articulate the 
qualitative distinctions involved in strong evaluation. Language, Taylor 
argues, following what he calls the ‘expressivist’ Romantic tradition of 
Herder and Humboldt, is constitutive of human attitudes, not merely a 
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24 For example, Taylor, Human Agency and Language, pp. 102, 234.
25 C. Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences. Philosophical Papers II, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 190–191.
26 Taylor, Philosophy and the Human Sciences, pp. 204–206. See also J. Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 162 and Y. Tamir, Liberal 
Nationalism, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993, p. 30.
27 See, for example, D. T. Meyers, Self, Society, and Personal Choice, New York, 
Columbia University Press, 1989; M. Friedman, Autonomy, Gender, Politics, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, and C. Mackenzie & N Stoljar (eds.), Relational 
Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2000.
28 See S. Scheffler, Human Morality, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, and 
J. D. Velleman, “A Rational Superego?” The Philosophical Review, vol. 108, 1999, 
pp. 529–558.
means for representing them. As self-interpreting animals, who we are 
depends in part on who we take ourselves to be, on how we understand 
ourselves. We start out with an inchoate sense of the import of a situa-
tion – something bothers me about the tone of a remark a friend 
made – and try to find the right words for it; perhaps reflection leads 
me to believe using that tone in that context bespoke of envy. Coming 
to formulate the matter in this way changes how one feels about the 
situation, given that there is an internal relation between our emotions 
and our interpretation of their objects. This enhanced sense of signifi-
cance, made possible by linguistic articulation, enables us to form new 
kinds of goals and relationships to others.24 Thus it is essential for the 
sort of attitudes that constitute strong evaluations. And since there is 
no private language, this is a strong argument for what Taylor else-
where calls the ‘social thesis’, the claim that human beings “only develop 
their characteristically human capacities in society”, that “living in 
society is a necessary condition … of becoming a fully responsible, 
autonomous being”.25 He argues further that eventually conceiving of 
alternative ways of life in a way that is an essential component of 
the kind of autonomy that liberals and libertarians value requires – 
including the very idea of going against prevailing conventions – is 
possible only within particular social and historical contexts.26
In sum, communitarians argue that belonging to a suitable kind of 
community is what makes possible having identities that provide con-
stitutive ends, having the kind of evaluatively rich language that ena-
bles articulating and revising these ends, and developing an imagination 
that allows one to envision living differently from one’s role models, all 
capacities necessary for autonomous agency. Many feminists27 and 
psychoanalytically influenced theorists28 have presented similar views 
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29 “It’s hard to conceive of an argument that possession of a capacity is valuable even 
though its exercise is devoid of value … The ideal of autonomy is that of autonomous 
life. The capacity for autonomy is a secondary sense of ‘autonomy’ ” (Raz, 1986, p. 372).
30 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political 
Philosophical Exchange. Verso, London, 2003, p. 181.
31 I do not mean to suggest that positive attitudes toward oneself exhaust the 
psychological conditions for the exercise of autonomy. There are also the so-called 
and further evidence supporting the contention that, as a matter of 
empirical fact, only participation in particular kinds of social relation-
ships enables one to learn the sort of evaluative and motivational 
capacities required for being autonomous. This view is now broadly 
accepted, though its implications can be a matter of fierce debate.
3. Recognition and the Psychological Conditions  
of Exercising Autonomy
As the accounts discussed in the previous section show, acquiring 
autonomy-constituting capacities plausibly depends on intersubjective 
relationships. However, to be autonomous, one needs more than the 
simple ability to act autonomously; one must be in a position to exer-
cise this ability. This is not optional, since it is only through the exercise 
of autonomy skills that one shapes an authentic self in the first place. 
Thus people must actually exercise a fair degree of control over the 
direction of their lives to count as autonomous. As Joseph Raz stresses, 
it is the exercise and not the mere capacity for autonomy that we 
hold so dear.29 It is essential to my argument that this exercise of self-
determination can be supported or defeated both by internal and 
external conditions. In this section, I examine accounts that focus on 
the former, and return to the latter in section 5.
The second family of empirical intersubjectivist conceptions of 
autonomy thus focuses on the influence of intersubjective relation-
ships on agents’ second-order capacities for autonomy – in other words, 
psychological capacities that are required for the agent to exercise their 
first-order, autonomy-constituting capacities, “to actually make use of 
their autonomy”.30 Broadly speaking, the thesis is that the evaluative 
and motivational capacities of an agent (whether or not they are 
acquired only in particular social relationships) are as good as useless 
unless she also trusts in herself – that is, unless she has the capacity for 
particular self-directed emotional or affective attitudes.31 Autonomy 
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‘executive virtues’ like temperance, courage and fortitude that may be needed for one 
to make judgements and stand by them (see P. Pettit & M. Smith, “Practical Unreason,” 
Mind, vol. 102, 1993, pp. 76–77).
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cannot be understood merely in terms of the structure of beliefs and 
desires. As Axel Honneth puts it in a paper co-authored with Joel 
Anderson, to be autonomous, we must be able “to trust our own feel-
ings and intuitions, to stand up for what we believe in, and to consider 
our projects and accomplishments worthwhile”.32 The next step is the 
claim that the ability to adopt such attitudes depends on suitable inter-
personal relationships. A proponent of this type of intersubjective 
account thus has a double burden of proof: he or she must show both 
that autonomy requires a certain kind of attitude toward oneself and 
that autonomy-conducive relationships are at least empirically neces-
sary for having such attitudes.
Theories of this type have been proposed by Paul Benson in a series 
of articles and Honneth in his The Struggle for Recognition and subse-
quent works.33 I will focus here on Honneth, since his view is more 
comprehensive, both theoretically sophisticated and empirically sup-
ported. In these respects it represents a step forward from vague and 
sketchy suggestions in this direction by some feminist and communi-
tarian theorists. Honneth’s methodological starting point is a solid 
Hegelian insight: the dependence of autonomy on social relationships 
is revealed when the disruption of those relationships leads to reduc-
tion in one’s ability to make autonomous choices. The normally invis-
ible intersubjective dependence manifests itself when there is a 
problem. Examining such disruptions and their effects systematically 
we can construct a theory of autonomy-conducive relationships that is 
firmly rooted in everyday experience and psychological research.
Aiming to naturalise early Hegel’s account, Honneth argues that it is 
an empirical matter of fact we can acquire and sustain such attitudes 
toward ourselves only when others adopt corresponding attitudes 
toward us – in other words, if we are recognised by those whose atti-
tudes we in turn regard as authoritative, that is, those whom we recog-
nise. Because these attitudes are necessary for autonomy, autonomy 
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depends on mutual recognition. As we have seen, insofar as such the-
ses are found in Fichte and Hegel, they are most plausibly read as tran-
scendental arguments about the conditions of possibility of particular 
kinds of self-relation. Honneth, however, believes that in contempo-
rary ‘postmetaphysical’ context, what is needed is “a reconstruction of 
[Hegel’s] initial thesis in the light of empirical social psychology”.34 
I will next summarise the arguments and evidence he presents for the 
necessity of three kinds of self-relation, self-confidence, self-respect 
and self-esteem, for exercising autonomy-constituting capacities, and 
the empirical dependence of these self-relations on being correspond-
ingly recognised by others. It must be noted at the outset that Honneth 
does not always formulate the importance of recognition in terms of its 
contribution to autonomy, but also talks about recognition as a condi-
tion of self-realisation (Selbstverwirklichung), personal integrity, intact 
self-relation and personal identity-formation. It is not exactly clear 
what the relationship of these concepts is to autonomy; on the face of 
it, they are far from equivalent, though no doubt related. In the follow-
ing, I will focus solely on recognition as a condition of autonomy.
3.1. Self-Confidence
The first recognition-mediated self-relation in Honneth’s schema is 
basic self-confidence, understood as a positive affective attitude toward 
one’s own desires. He draws empirical support for the recognition-
dependence of self-confidence from object-relations theory. According 
to its leading proponent, Donald Winnicott, the child and the mother 
initially form an undifferentiated intersubjectivity. When the mother 
gradually returns to life after the initial ‘holding phase’, there is a crisis 
for the infant that manifests itself in tantrums and aggression toward 
the mother. For Winnicott, this leads both child and mother to see 
each other as separate subjects with independent needs. At the same 
time, they become aware of their mutual dependence. As the mother 
continues to provide reliably for the needs of the child in spite of its 
manifesting aggressive impulses, the child can begin to express what it 
wants without fear of being abandoned. As Honneth puts it, “In becom-
ing sure of the ‘mother’s’ love, young children come to trust themselves, 
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which makes it possible for them to be alone without anxiety”.35 The 
idea seems to be that when the child is not rejected because of unruly 
impulses, it comes to see the satisfaction of its basic needs and desires 
as having inherent value for the other in spite of diverging from the 
other’s needs and desires. In internalising the other’s positive valua-
tion, one comes to see one’s basic needs for physical and psychological 
integrity as worth being satisfied and gains “strength to open up to 
himself or herself in a relaxed relation-to-self ”.36 This, according to 
Honneth, is essential for autonomy, since “self-trust has to do with the 
affectively mediated perceptual capacities by which what is subjec-
tively felt becomes material for deliberation in the first place”.37 These 
“body-bound drive impulses, the ‘id’ in Freud’s sense “push the grow-
ing child into the direction of “a higher degree of individuation in its 
articulation of needs”.38
If recognition in the form of love and caring is empirically necessary 
for openness to desires that push one away from social conformity, in 
particular those related to the body, their absence or active misrecog-
nition should manifest itself in disruption of this self-relationship. 
Again drawing on empirical studies, Honneth argues that this is indeed 
the case. Misrecognition here consists of physical and psychological 
abuse, in the worst case torture and rape, resulting in, on the one hand, 
“lasting damage to one’s basic confidence (learned through love) that 
one can autonomously coordinate one’s own body”39 and on the other, 
the inability of victims to “trust their desires to be authentically their 
own”.40 Without confidence in the authenticity or worth of what one 
wants or the related sense of being at home in one’s body, the exercise 
of the capacity of assessing one’s desires and acting on the assessment is 
impaired. Thus one’s autonomy – apparently understood here roughly 
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on the hierarchical model – is diminished because of emotional mis-
recognition, and shown to depend on positive recognition.
3.2. Self-Respect
To make independent choices, we have to be willing to listen to our-
selves, and acquiring the basic self-confidence required for this 
depends, as a matter of fact, on being loved. However, making choices 
and especially acting on them require also that we have faith in our 
practical judgement, that we are not cowed by the opinions of others. 
It is one thing to defer to someone else’s judgement on occasion and 
another to defer to it by default. To be autonomous, therefore, one 
must consider oneself to have an equal standing and authority in mak-
ing judgements on the basis of generally acceptable reasons; in short, 
one must have self-respect. As Anderson and Honneth formulate it, 
“[i] f one cannot think of oneself as a competent deliberator and legiti-
mate co-author of decisions, it is hard to see how one can take oneself 
seriously in one’s own practical reasoning about what to do”.41 The sec-
ond thesis of Honneth’s recognitional view of autonomy is, conse-
quently, that self-respect, as a matter of fact, depends on a certain kind 
of recognition by others. Love alone will not suffice for this (though it 
no doubt involves respecting the loved one’s take on the situation), 
since it is in the first instance a matter of responding to our needs and 
desires. What, then, does it take for us to be able to view ourselves as 
capable choosers, as agents deserving the respect of others in virtue of 
having a capacity to weigh reasons and act on them? The first step is 
naturally that we are consulted in disputes about what to do and that 
others in turn present us with reasons rather than, say, brute orders. 
However, this alone is not sufficient; to respect ourselves we must feel 
that others owe it to us to take our views into account, and this requires 
guarantees that we will be heard. So, according to Honneth, we can 
take ourselves to deserve respect only when there exist social or legal 
sanctions against treating us in ways that bypass our own judgement – 
that is, when we are conscious of having rights (and duties).42 Once we 
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can expect that our legitimate claims against others will be socially or 
legally enforced, we gain confidence in our judgement. Honneth quotes 
Joel Feinberg, according to whom “[h]aving rights enables us to ‘stand 
up like men’, to look others in the eye, and to feel in some fundamental 
way equal of anyone”.43 As a form of recognition, granting rights differs 
in many ways from love: it does not require an emotional attachment 
and admits of historical development both in terms of including new 
groups of subjects and introducing new kinds of rights.44
Again, the dependence of self-respect on recognition in the form of 
rights and equal treatment is clearest in the breach. Being consistently 
excluded, ignored, or marginalised can lead to habitual passivity and 
timidity. Those who have some self-respect may feel shame or bitter-
ness and be motivated to struggle for more comprehensive recogni-
tion. Others may sink into quiet obedience. To take a concrete example, 
Paul Benson discusses the persistent sense of shame associated with 
slavery. He points out that “[t]he social mechanisms that sustained 
slavery did so in part by working to destroy slaves’ sense of their com-
petence to make their own decisions and manage their own lives”.45 
Less drastic but perhaps more widespread is the diminished self-
respect of many women in patriarchal societies.46 In each case, one is 
unable to exercise one’s autonomy-constituting capacities, even if they 
should otherwise be intact, which shows that self-respect and the kind 
of recognition that makes it possible are empirically needed for being 
autonomous.
3.3. Self-Esteem
It might at first appear that self-confidence and self-respect would suf-
fice for one to be able to exercise one’s autonomy-constituting capaci-
ties. However, independent action requires more than faith in our 
general capacity for making judgements. We must also be convinced of 
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the worth of the particular projects and commitments we undertake 
and the particular character traits and abilities they require or 
express.  In Rawls’ words, “When we feel that our plans are of little 
value, we cannot pursue them with pleasure or take delight in their 
execution. Nor plagued by failure and self-doubt can we continue in 
our endeavours”.47 Our projects and plans give content to our practical 
identities, making us the kind of people we are. If we are not able to 
value ourselves under certain descriptions or if we do not have faith in 
our own ability to carry out the plan – if we lack self-esteem – we are 
likely to give up on particular endeavours, even if we would otherwise 
confidently judge them best. In this way autonomy depends on 
self-esteem.
On the recognitional view, self-esteem requires that the identities 
and abilities of the agent are considered valuable within “a symboli-
cally articulated – yet always open and porous – framework of orienta-
tion in which those ethical values and goals are formulated that, taken 
together, comprise the cultural self-understanding of a society”.48 
Anderson and Honneth call this dependence our semantic vulnerabil-
ity: the significance attached to a way of being and doing is a linguistic 
matter, and as such is not controlled by an individual’s intentions. 
Instead, it is a matter of connections established through use and rep-
etition in language games, patterns of talk, action and attitude. What it 
means to be ‘a union man’, for example, depends on an evolving social 
process, a web of mutually reinforcing individual uses, and corre-
spondingly varies between cultures and times. Where a negative stigma 
is attached to a practical identity, it is hard to value oneself under that 
description, and related projects and actions get closed off the delib-
erative screen, reducing autonomy. A sense of shame, characteristically 
felt when under a real or imaginary gaze of disapproving or taunting 
others, motivates one to hide and conform rather than go on with one’s 
plans.
For Honneth, social esteem is tied to the contribution one makes to 
goals that are considered valuable in a society – it is, so to speak, a cur-
rency in which society rewards those who do a service to it. With 
modernity, social esteem becomes a matter of individual achievement 
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rather than a predefined role or status hierarchy. Goals are shared only 
at a high level of abstraction and call for supplemental cultural inter-
pretation – even if everyone agrees that, say, intelligence is valuable, it 
is still an open question what constitutes intelligence.49 As Honneth 
makes clear in his debate with Nancy Fraser, for him the symbolic 
value of individual achievements is central for issues of distribution as 
well: according to him, even collective action for wage rises is an 
attempt by workers to “throw the established evaluative models into 
question by fighting for greater esteem of their social contributions, 
and thereby for economic redistribution”.50
To sum up, Honneth’s view is that we can as a matter of fact only 
acquire self-confidence through being loved, self-respect through 
being treated as inviolable, and self-esteem through having our pur-
suits socially valued. In the absence of such attitudes toward ourselves, 
we are psychologically hindered from exercising our autonomy- 
constituting capacities of accessing our authentic desires and feelings, 
making judgements based on reasons deriving from them, and follow-
ing through on the judgements. Thus, being recognised is an empiri-
cally necessary condition for being autonomous.51
3.4. Empirical Intersubjectivism and Individualism
I have now outlined how both acquiring autonomy-constituting capac-
ities and having the psychological second-order capacities necessary 
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for exercising them causally depend on social interaction. It is time to 
point out that in fairness to traditional individualist conceptions, so far 
I have presented nothing that, say, Frankfurt or Mele could not accept 
and accommodate, with the possible exception of Fichte’s view. This 
may sound surprising to some, but it is a straightforward consequence 
of the empirical nature of the claims made so far. Marilyn Friedman is 
perhaps the most forthright of all empirical intersubjectivists in 
acknowledging that her view of what constitutes autonomy is tradition-
ally individualist.52 However, the same goes for Honneth. By emphasis-
ing the empirical and naturalistic character of his theory, he is 
committed to treating recognition by others as contributing merely 
causally to one’s autonomy, by way of helping establish a positive prac-
tical self-relation. If this is all, there is a danger of false advertising 
when Honneth talks about “the profoundly intersubjective nature 
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of autonomy”.53 There is nothing the individualist need dispute. Gerald 
Dworkin, for example, encourages philosophers to suggest empirical 
hypotheses about “what psychological and social conditions are likely 
to promote the development and maintenance of autonomous indi-
viduals”.54 Thus there seems to be no essential philosophical difference 
between weak intersubjectivism and traditional individualism, only a 
different focus of attention, and a reliance on empirical theories in the 
case of the former. Given that the ultimate aim of intersubjectivists is 
as a rule in political philosophy, this may not be so problematic, so 
long as the empirical theories hold water – why should it matter if 
something is conceptually or only causally necessary for autonomy, if 
you are designing institutions that promote autonomy?
This dialectical situation does, however, put a heavy burden of proof 
on empirical intersubjectivists who want to go beyond what traditional 
liberals already allow is needed for respecting autonomy. I want to fin-
ish this section by noting a few concerns about Honneth’s empirical 
assumptions. First, the empirical results he appeals to do not rank par-
ticularly high on scientific standards. The psychological theories that 
Honneth spends most time discussing belong to the psychoanalytic 
tradition. To put it charitably, there is little hard evidence for claims 
made by psychoanalytic theorists, and yet equally few inhibitions in 
the way of making grand, implausible claims like the mother and child 
being initially “incapable of individually demarcating themselves from 
each other”.55 The theories of Winnicott and Benjamin are highly spec-
ulative, arguably more so than the folk psychological hunches of phi-
losophers, so there is scarce solid empirical support to be found in this 
direction. When it comes to self-respect and self-esteem, Honneth 
himself is content with appealing to our common experience. This is 
fine in itself, and the claims that he makes are by and large plausible. 
Insofar as they draw on commonsense folk psychological knowledge, 
however, they must be judged by commonsense criteria.
This brings us to the second main problem: when Honneth’s claims 
are judged by the sort of commonsense criteria he avails himself of, 
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they turn out to be too weak to force a significant revision of liberal-
ism. Basically, it is plausible that being recognised is empirically neces-
sary for acquiring sufficient capacity to respect or esteem oneself. But 
once people have come to be able to respect and esteem themselves, 
misrecognition may simply lead them to resent those who do not 
respect or esteem them rather than prevent them from exercising their 
autonomy-constituting capacities. As Honneth himself acknowledges 
in the paper co-authored with Anderson, it is “psychologically possible 
to sustain a sense of self-worth in the face of denigrating and humiliat-
ing attitudes”, though it is “harder to do so, and there are significant 
costs associated with having to shield oneself from these negative atti-
tudes and having to find subcultures for support”.56 What is more, there 
seem to be straightforward counter-examples to the recognitional 
view: it is surely not impossible that there could be self-respecting 
slaves who have never been respected by others, certainly not in terms 
of giving them rights. In light of such considerations, Diana Tietjens 
Meyers argues that “[t]here are autonomous dissenters and revolution-
aries and legions of individuals who autonomously craft private lives 
within the confines of oppressive regimes”.57 If this is right, then it is 
certainly possible to be overcome psychological obstacles to exercising 
autonomy without being recognised at a given moment, even if it may 
indeed be harder.
4. Recognition and Normative Competence
The doubts I raised at the end of the previous section about the empiri-
cal validity of the recognitional view are far from decisive, and I will 
continue to assume that as a rule, recognition is needed to obtain the 
psychological conditions for the exercise of autonomy. However, there 
is another, more serious problem with Honneth’s assumptions about 
autonomy-constituting capacities. Openness to one’s desires and sub-
sequent deliberation about them plays a major role in his view. 
However, recent discussions within action theory and metaethics 
strongly challenge this picture of desire and deliberation, providing 
support for a substantive conception of autonomy. Once we conceive 
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of autonomy-constituting capacities along substantivist lines with rea-
sons-responsiveness as a central component, we must reformulate the 
details of the recognitional view accordingly, if it is to retain its plausi-
bility in contemporary discussion.
4.1. Desires, Reasons and Deliberation
As we have seen, for Honneth the most basic form of recognition in 
the form of love and friendship enables one to access one’s desires and 
feelings in deliberation, to treat them as reason-giving. The following 
passage sums up this view nicely: “[A]utonomous agents are … open 
to those sources of identity and choice that underlie practical reasons, 
in the primitive and inchoate urges, impulses, longings, and despair-
ings that can come to be transformed into reasons”.58 The view 
presumes that first, (some) desires are reasons (or perhaps sources 
of  reasons), second, we deliberate about our desires, and finally, 
desires  and urges somehow express the authentic individuality of the 
agent. Each of these theses represents a problematic inward orienta-
tion at odds with Honneth’s avowed departure from subject-centred 
philosophy.
To begin with the relationship between desires and reasons, few phi-
losophers working in metaethics today would deny that most of our 
(normative) reasons for action, considerations that favour doing some-
thing or adopting an attitude, are desire-independent facts about the 
world, though some still fight a rearguard action of claiming that these 
facts owe their status as reasons for our desires.59 What reasons are 
there for me to sit outside and read? Why, the fact that the sun is shin-
ing, that it would be pleasant, that reading this book would be useful. 
No desires or beliefs feature in the list. The belief that the sun is shin-
ing, for example, would not be a reason for me to go out, since if it were 
false, it would not favour my doing so.60 However, is it not the case that 
the sunshine is a reason for me to go out because I want to sit in the sun 
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(the rearguard strategy I mentioned above)? No. First of all, I want to 
sit outside because I think I would enjoy it – the very fact that is the 
reason for me to go out is the reason why I want to do so in the first 
place. Second, we often have reasons to do things we do not want to do, 
even if we are fully informed about the situation; for example, the ado-
lescent anorectic has a good reason to eat even if they do not want to. 
Third, if there were no reason for me to go out, my wanting to do so 
would not provide me with one. What Jonathan Dancy calls “the sim-
ple argument” is that if φ-ing is silly or just not very sensible, desiring 
to φ does not make it any less silly or more sensible; nor does it give a 
reason to do something that subserves φ-ing.61 He refines this by point-
ing out that generally, we desire to do something for a reason, because 
it would lead to or promote something of value. If the desire is based 
on a reason, desiring itself does not add to the reasons. If, on the other 
hand, the desire is not based on a reason, we can have no reason not to 
abandon it.62
Since desires are not the source of our practical reasons, it is not 
surprising that they have at best a minor place in our practical reason-
ing and deliberation. Honneth, like Frankfurt and Korsgaard,63 seems 
to hold that we focus on what we want and feel when we reason practi-
cally; it is as if desires ‘propose’ certain courses of action, which we 
then reflectively endorse or reject. In this vein, Honneth talks about 
‘trusting’ desires and ‘engaging’ with one’s feelings, and about ‘open-
ness’ to one’s ‘internal voices’. However, this argument skirts close to 
committing what Simon Blackburn terms “the fundamental mistake 
about deliberation”.64 When I deliberate or reflect on whether to go to 
a concert or a football match, say, I do not, as it were, close my eyes and 
focus on how I feel when I think about the alternatives.65 Instead, 
I  focus outward, on the features of the alternatives. What counts for or 
against an option is not that I want or do not want to take it, but 
whether or not it is worth taking because of its properties.66 Even if 
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I ask myself whether I really want to do something – a question that 
Meyers and Sandel, for example, see as central for autonomous 
agents67  – all this amounts to is asking whether the course of action, 
by my lights, is really worth taking.68 In Gareth Evans’s terms, self-
knowledge is transparent with regard to our take on the world in 
non-pathological cases – to ask whether I believe that p, I consider 
whether p or not, looking out, not in.69 In short, we must reject any 
picture of autonomous deliberation according to which our desires or 
feelings are, as we might put it, deliberatively salient, except in excep-
tional cases.
The third and final problem with Honneth’s account of basic self-
confidence concerns the status of “creative impulses” or “desires, 
impulses, fantasies, and other dimensions of subjectivity”70 as manifes-
tations of spontaneous, creative agency – the Meadian ‘I’, as opposed to 
‘me’, or the Freudian ‘id’.71 This kind of view can hardly help assuming 
that there is some pure, unspoiled inner core or self from which these 
‘creative impulses’ stem, whereas in fact one need not worship at the 
altar of Michel Foucault to acknowledge that socialisation, cultural 
models and media images – not to mention biological facts – crucially 
shape our fantasies and unreflective urges. It is no surprise that fanta-
sies can be boringly similar within cultures, and differ in predictable 
ways among them. Second, partly for this reason, control by urges, 
impulses, and the like is one of the paradigmatic contrasts with auton-
omy, as I noted in the first section. Insofar as they are not already rea-
sons-responsive, it is quite unclear how the desires and urges could 
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be ‘transformed into reasons’ on which one acts autonomously. 
On the contrary, we act spontaneously precisely when we use our 
rational capacities that allow us to transcend both inner urges and 
socialisation.
4.2. Autonomy and Normative Competence
The evaluative capacity required for being held accountable and thus 
autonomous is not, then, one that has to do with one’s desires, but with 
desire-independent reasons for action. In other words, hierarchical 
accounts of the sort Honneth relies on are out of the question. 
Evaluative beliefs are beliefs about the world, and deliberation is like-
wise oriented at potential courses of action and the value they bring 
about. As such, this is compatible with evaluativist as well as normative 
competence accounts of autonomy competency. However, I believe we 
have reason to prefer the latter. On normative competence accounts, it 
is not sufficient that our actions flow from our deep selves or strong 
evaluations, but those evaluations themselves have to be at least mod-
erately responsive to the reasons that we have – reasons that may be 
personal (relative to one’s personal history, commitments, capacities, 
pleasures, relationships, unique situation, and so on72), social, aes-
thetic, moral, or whatever. According to them, being autonomous 
implies that if I had a strong reason not to engage in the activities I do, 
I would be able to realise this and change my conception of what is 
worth doing. Thus false beliefs about the value of my central projects 
would undermine my autonomy. This view makes evaluative and fac-
tual mistakes symmetrical: just like I would not be self-governing with 
respect to an action if I chose it out of ignorance of fact (I thought it 
would lead to a desirable outcome, whereas in fact it was never going 
to), I would not be self-governing with respect to it if I chose it out of 
ignorance of value (I thought the outcome was desirable, whereas in 
fact it was nothing like that). While individual mistakes are compatible 
with autonomy on this account – so that people who wrong others or 
are just plain silly sometimes do not automatically lose autonomy – 
systematic mistakes are not.73
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74 For the notion of adaptive preferences, see J. Elster, Sour Grapes, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1983.
75 S. Wolf, “Sanity and the Metaphysics of Responsibility”, 1987, reprinted in 
Watson, 2003, p. 385.
76 As Susan Wolf puts it, according to the M’Naughten rule, a person is sane 
(responsible) “if (1) he knows what he is doing and (2) he knows that what he is doing 
is, as the case may be, right or wrong” (Wolf, 1987, p. 381).
77 See Joesph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, 
pp. 390–395. Michael Smith formulates the connection between normative compe-
tence and the value of autonomy very strongly: “[W]e value agents ruling themselves 
to just the extent that, in so doing, they thereby manifest their capacity to get things 
right” (Smith, 2004).
This view has several benefits. When we are responsive to reasons, 
our values are not hostage to mere chance or prevailing views; our 
preferences are not ‘adaptive’ in the sense in which those of a con-
tended slave will be.74 Instead, we are able to revise them, even, as 
Susan Wolf puts it, correct or improve ourselves.75 To take a mundane 
example, suppose I am musically talented and would considerably 
enjoy playing an instrument. In this situation, it is plausible that I have 
a reason to take up playing music at least as a hobby. If I am not capable 
of recognising this, my choice about what to do in my free time will 
be less autonomous; it will be explained by such factors as peer pres-
sure and cultural conventions. If my choice is, however, partly explained 
by my (genuine) recognition of what reasons I have, it will potentially 
transcend these other factors. It will shape an identity that is genuinely 
my own. Second, the normative competence approach preserves best 
the link between autonomy and responsibility, since it is not fair to hold 
responsible agents who are through no fault of their own incapable of 
recognising the difference between (morally, legally and otherwise) 
right and wrong. This is recognised in such legal conventions as the 
M’Naughten rule.76 Third, it also best explains the value of autonomy. 
Autonomy is valuable, since it leads us to valuable pursuits that we can 
experience as our own, thus contributing to our wellbeing. Choice that 
is not responsive to reasons may or may not be good for the agent; if it 
is valuable, it is not as valuable as reasons-responsive choice.77 Finally, 
and related to the previous point, from the inside, first-personal per-
spective, it matters greatly to us whether what we take to be valuable 
really is valuable, or whether it just seems so. As Charles Taylor puts it, 
“how can we deny that it makes a difference to the degree of freedom 
not only whether one of my basic purposes is frustrated by my own 
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desires but also whether I have grievously misidentified this pur-
pose?”78 If I discover that in doing what I really wanted I was chasing 
something quite worthless, I can quite intelligibly feel, that had I been 
in a better position to make autonomous choices, I might have been 
capable of recognising where the real reasons lay.
4.3. Recognition and Reasons-Responsiveness
Given that we are best off conceiving autonomy-constituting capacities 
in terms of reasons-responsiveness, how should we think of the self-
relations that make possible their exercise? Is it possible to reformulate 
the recognitional view so as to take this into account? In this section, 
I will briefly explore how this could be accomplished. Since desires 
play a central role in Honneth’s account of self-confidence, I will focus 
on that – little reformulation is needed for the accounts of self-respect 
and self-esteem.
My suggestion is that we start from the idea that desires are responses 
to “appearances of the good”, as Sergio Tenenbaum puts it, following 
the scholastics.79 What we trust when we have basic self-confidence, 
then, is that what appears to us as valuable or reasonable is such in real-
ity – in particular, that what appears to us as a personal reason really is 
a reason that potentially grounds claims on others as well. For exam-
ple, let us imagine that it seems to me there is good reason for me to 
take part in a demonstration against budget cuts for schools. My self-
confidence manifests itself in my taking this seeming seriously in 
deliberating about the issue. If I lacked self-confidence, I would dis-
miss this sense of things that I have and perhaps consider only reasons 
related to what my superiors might think about demonstrating. 
Reformulating the account in these terms preserves the connection to 
intersubjective recognition, since it is plausible that I learn to trust 
appearances of the good (as well as discriminate between mere seem-
ings and epistemically valuable appearances) in the sort of early child-
hood interaction that Honneth talks about – from my perspective, 
what seems good to and for me really is good, since others are willing 
to take the trouble to bring it about. My pleasure and pain do not mat-
ter just to me, but to others as well. They do not merely push and pull 
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pp. 9–10, 75, 78.
me, but serve as sources of reasons, and as such ground claims on 
others.
We can also reformulate in less metaphorical terms the psychoana-
lytic insight that maturity is not just a matter of the ego controlling 
inner urges but “inner dialogue” in which desires have a speaking 
part.80 The insight here is that conscious, deliberative judgement does 
not necessarily represent one’s perspective on an issue. It may itself be 
deformed by oppressive socialisation. Nomy Arpaly uses Huckleberry 
Finn as an example.81 Huck, who has been raised to think of ‘niggers’ 
as inferior, gets to know the slave Jim, helps him escape, and finds him-
self even apologising to him. At the level of reflective judgement, Huck 
believes he is acting wrongly in treating a slave as a full person, since 
this is the only position that he can articulate in the language available 
to him. He reproaches himself for having “the spunk of a rabbit”, but 
cannot bring himself to turn Jim in. Yet it is clear in the context of the 
story that helping Jim reflects best his own, inchoate sense of what 
there is reason to do; as we might say, his authentic self is in control 
when he acts against his articulated judgement. This is manifest, for 
example, in his emotions when he considers the various alternatives. 
In such a situation, acting autonomously requires precisely going 
against one’s judgement and instead listening and trusting one’s affec-
tively laden sense of things. Since this is always potentially the case, a 
rigid personality is harmful to autonomy; reasons-responsiveness 
manifests itself not only in judgement, but also in desire and emotion 
themselves.
5. The Social Conditions of Exercising Autonomy
The subjective experience of recognition is plausibly an empirically 
necessary internal or psychological (and thus indirectly intersubjec-
tive) condition for the exercise of autonomy competency, understood 
along the lines of a normative competence view. Are there any external 
or social necessary conditions for the exercise of autonomy though? 
How might we defend a strongly intersubjective conception that ties 
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autonomy directly and constitutively to standing in certain kinds of 
relationships? I will make the case in the same Hegelian manner as 
Honneth does, by looking at cases in which autonomy is reduced sim-
ply in virtue of lack of such relationships and laying out what features 
they have in common. If it is the case that someone’s autonomy can be 
diminished despite intact psychological capacities and practical self-
relations, having a certain social standing or status is itself constitutive 
of autonomy. On this view, there can be two psychologically identical 
agents, one of them autonomous, the other non-autonomous, in virtue 
of their different social relationships.82 To provide support for this, 
I will first present some test cases for which this strong thesis seems to 
hold. To assess these cases, we must bear in mind the theoretical role of 
personal autonomy as the kind of authentic self-determination that 
allows their lives to express the agent’s practical identity and grounds 
the fairness of holding the agent fully accountable – praising or blam-
ing her for them. This theoretical role connects autonomy to common-
sense concepts, with regard to which we can regard our considered 
intuitions as authoritative. Is this kind of life a manifestation of the 
agent’s deep commitments? Does she warrant blame for particular 
kinds of choices? If the intuitive answer is negative, the agent does not 
count as (fully) autonomous— – she may have the capacities, but if 
unable to exercise them, her autonomy remains a potentiality.
Here are four test cases for the strongly intersubjective thesis:
Case 1. Jim is a slave. He grew up in freedom, and is as capable of recog-
nising and assessing reasons for action as anyone else, and suffers from 
no volitional or motivational defects. Though he loathes his circum-
stances, he respects himself – indeed, that is one reason why he so loathes 
his circumstances. He takes care of his heavy duties well, and has no 
problem with his self-esteem; he knows he is capable of much. It is no 
surprise, then, that Jim is capable of forming a conception of good life for 
himself within the realities of his society, and a corresponding life-plan. 
But he has no opportunity to pursue it, since his master has the coercive 
power to impose his own plans on Jim. And even if Jim’s plan were to fall 
within the limits that his master would tolerate, the master would remain 
in a position to undo it on an arbitrary whim, regardless of Jim’s own 
judgement.
Case 2. Z lives in a state run on fundamentalist religious principles. Like 
Jim, she has full autonomy competency, respects herself, and trusts in the 
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validity of her emotions and desires in revealing what is good for her. 
However, she is sexually aroused only by women. In her society homo-
sexual conduct is legally, socially and culturally discouraged. Though her 
sexual orientation makes it impossible for her to adopt the kind of iden-
tity that there is available for women in her culture – built as it is around 
marriage and motherhood – there does not exist an alternative practice 
of lesbian relationships that would provide a social matrix of significance 
within which she could develop an identity she is at home with, nor does 
she have the opportunity to participate in the creation of such a 
practice.
Case 3. Billy Bob is a policeman. He has the same competencies, skills 
and attitudes toward the self as Jim and Z. However, due to a combina-
tion of factors including the nature of his work, genetic predispositions 
and ignorance, he has gained 145 kilograms by his early 30s, quite a lot 
for such a short man. He was never any good at developing a rapport 
with women, and has not had a relationship for longer than anyone can 
remember. All he wants from life is to find someone special and settle 
down for good.
Case 4. Despite growing up in a broken family, Tammy has her rational 
capacities and self-confidence intact. To make ends meet and pay for the 
trailer where she lives with her binge-drinking boyfriend, she works long 
hours cleaning and scrubbing the houses of the rich. Like her co- 
workers, she suffers from chronic back pain, cramps and arthritic attacks. 
Still, the company that pays her minimum wage boasts in its brochure: 
“We clean floors the old-fashioned way – on our hands and knees”, so she 
has to assume that humiliating position in front of the upper-class 
housewives who scrutinise and point out every speck of dirt she fails to 
notice. This is not her idea of a good life, but it is the best she can get with 
the cards she was dealt and the rules that were handed down.83
In each of the cases, the subject is capable of being autonomous, both 
in the sense of having the necessary rational and motivational capaci-
ties and meeting the psychological conditions for their exercise. Yet 
they are in different ways prevented from exercising their autonomy by 
their social environments, and therefore are not autonomous. They are 
not in control of their lives in the sense that matters. It may be unlikely 
that they still respect, esteem and trust themselves, but it does happen 
and it is not all that rare – people do adjust their expectations to their 
chances, and there may be systematic indoctrination and ideology 
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involved.84 A positive relation to self that is rooted in false beliefs about 
one’s standing in the eyes of others is no guarantee of autonomy.
5.1. Lacking Opportunities
The first three cases are examples of three dimensions of objective mis-
recognition. The first I will call the dimension of (external) domination. 
Domination in this sense occurs when the agent is coerced actually or 
virtually by an agent or institution that gives no weight to their rea-
sons – that is, is vulnerable to interference that is not in their avowed 
or avowable interests. As Philip Pettit puts it, to be in this position of 
relative powerlessness it is sufficient that one could be coerced without 
impunity.85 This is the case when one cannot effectively enforce one’s 
claim to be treated as a person capable of assessing and adopting long-
term goals. As a consequence, the opportunity to plan ahead or carry 
out one’s rational life-plan is not available to the dominated agent. She 
does not have the necessary legal, social, or cultural standing for this, 
nor does she have the opportunity to challenge the rules of the practice 
that relegates her own views to irrelevance. Slaves are the most salient 
examples of this form of misrecognition, but as Pettit notes, in many 
cultures subjugated wives, for example, are not in a much better posi-
tion.86 Their authorship in their lives is limited to trivial decisions, and 
they cannot be held responsible for failing to develop their talents, for 
example.87 Prisoners, by contrast, may be autonomous – though they 
are coerced – if that takes place as a result of their past autonomous 
action in violation of laws that they (have reason to) at least tacitly 
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accept, punishment is precisely what it takes to treat them as rational 
decision-makers.88
The second dimension of misrecognition is that of marginalisation 
of identities. Marginalisation either rules out or makes it harder for 
one to live the sort of life one has chosen, or perhaps just gravitated 
toward, for good reasons. This is because most, if not all, identity-
defining projects or ‘comprehensive goals’ (Joseph Raz) that give direc-
tion to one’s life are embedded in broader social practices or ‘social 
forms’.89 Take careers: one of Raz’s examples is being a doctor, which is 
not just a matter of having skills to cure people but also involves “gen-
eral recognition of a medical practice, its social organization, its status 
in society, its conventions about which matters are addressed to doc-
tors and which not … and its conventions about the suitable relations 
between doctors and their patients”.90 It is not just that it is hard to 
value oneself as a doctor in such a society, as Honneth would allow; it 
is simply not possible to be one. The same goes for other kinds of iden-
tities that may seem natural. As Foucault so forcefully reminded us, a 
person who has sex with someone with similar genitals is not thereby 
a homosexual; there is a world of difference in the significance of sex-
ual acts between men in ancient Greece and in nineteenth-century 
Germany, France and Britain, where ‘the homosexual’ with “a past, a 
history and an adolescence, a personality, a life style; also a morphol-
ogy, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mystical physiology”91 
was born. In this sense, homosexuality is entirely unmysteriously and 
uncontroversially a social construction. Labelling someone a ‘homo-
sexual’, often a highly charged term, may be an act of repression or a 
prelude to one, but as Foucault himself hints, the existence of such a 
classification also provides materials for constructing new possibilities 
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of self-expression, as shown by contemporary gay identities and 
the  subcultures they are embedded in. In short, the social practices 
form a matrix of significance that is necessary for individuals to adopt 
meaningful life-plans, to exercise non-trivial reasoned choice. These 
practices are, obviously, contingent, historical and mutable; new mean-
ings, opportunities and identities are constantly being born, old ones 
reinforced and reinvented. No particular opportunity may be neces-
sary for autonomy as such, but legal, social or cultural prejudices that 
marginalise, stigmatise or penalise the practices that nourish certain 
identities  diminish the autonomy of those individuals who could 
authentically express themselves only (or best) within them. Since this 
is the case even when the individuals escape psychological injury, like 
Z in our example, the harm to autonomy is a matter of objective social 
relations.
The third dimension of objective misrecognition I call emotional 
exclusion. If domination limits one’s opportunities to realise one’s plans 
in general and marginalisation limits one’s opportunities to adopt par-
ticular identity-defining projects, emotional exclusion limits one’s 
opportunity to form personal relationships. It is perhaps conceivable 
that there could be a human being who would have the capacity to 
make choices about one’s life in response to reasons and would still 
not  seek to engage in any close relationships, but it is doubtful any 
such person has actually existed.92 For real people, pursuing and main-
taining relationships to family, friends and lovers is an essential com-
ponent of autonomous life. Correspondingly, their unavailability 
compromises the exercise of autonomy. Clearly, this is not much of a 
complaint when one gets turned down by someone one is attracted to, 
or never receives the invitation to cousin Agatha’s wedding. For emo-
tional exclusion to reduce autonomy, it must be a matter of systematic 
cultural value patterns that condemn people with certain qualities to a 
life of loneliness and detachment regardless of their contrary efforts.
It is no coincidence that these forms of objective misrecognition 
roughly coincide with the three dimensions of the subjective experi-
ence of recognition articulated by Honneth. Awareness of domina-
tion and lack of self-respect, awareness of marginalisation and lack of 
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self-esteem, and awareness of emotional exclusion and lack of basic 
self-confidence surely go together, empirically speaking. As I have 
argued, however, objective misrecognition with respect to power, iden-
tity or relationships by itself limits one’s opportunity to lead a life of 
authentic self-determination, regardless of one’s attitudes toward 
oneself.
Objective recognition, however, does not exhaust the social condi-
tions for the exercise of autonomy. Lack of competitive material 
resources resulting from economic exploitation is an independent con-
straint on the exercise of autonomy.93 (I emphasise the competitive 
aspect, since for success in many pursuits, it is one’s relative rather than 
absolute resources that count.94) As the situation of the cleaning woman 
in Case 4 shows, working for less than a living wage is apt to render one 
dependent on one’s employer or one’s family, leaving little room for 
significant autonomous choice. This hardly needs much argument. 
We can see this as a social condition of autonomy when we remember 
that the rules and principles of economic reward are legal, social and 
cultural in nature. There is nothing natural about bargaining situations 
that pin workers against employers separately rather than as a group, 
or inheritance laws that allow for accumulation of advantage from 
generation to generation. It is these rules rather than individual eco-
nomic decisions made within them that may restrict the availability of 
resources in a way that threatens the exercise of personal auton-
omy. Though economic exploitation often goes together with domina-
tion or marginalisation, it is still conceptually distinct, as Nancy Fraser 
stresses.95 White, well-educated and self-respecting men in recognised 
professions can yet be exploited by option-hungry management in the 
ruthless environment of predatory capitalism.
5.2. Being at Home in the Social World
I have defined both objective recognition and competitive resources 
terms of availability of a guaranteed chance to realise life-plans, live 
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out identities, participate in relationships, and make an independent 
living. But what does availability mean here? It obviously cannot mean 
getting what one wants whenever one wants it. Promoting someone’s 
autonomy does not require somehow providing her with magical or 
dictatorial control of her life.96 Nor should we rush to moralise auton-
omy, so that one could be autonomous only if one respects the like 
autonomy of others – it is possible to be personally autonomous and 
immoral, though normative competence involves some degree of sen-
sitivity to the reasons of others. Instead, I have implicitly interpreted 
availability democratically, in terms of the following three conditions. 
The goods required for the exercise of autonomy are available to an 
agent if and only if:
(a)  the rules of the relevant practices reflect the agent’s (personal and 
other) reasons
(b) the agent has the opportunity to ensure that (a) holds
(c)  the agent cognitively and emotionally accepts that (a) holds (the 
subjective experience of recognition)
The first condition is that the rules of the relevant practice must reflect 
the agent’s reasons. This is obviously a matter of degree, as it should be, 
since autonomy is a matter of degree. When the (usually implicit) rules 
of a social practice take into account an individual agent’s reasons, she 
has the opportunity to exercise her capacity to be responsive to these 
reasons in making her choices. For example, if Z derives sexual pleas-
ure from relations with other women, Z has a reason to explore such 
relations, and her autonomy will be reduced if the sexual mores of her 
social environment reflect only men’s interest in their pleasure and a 
social interest in reproduction. The second, participation condition, 
stresses that it cannot be a coincidence that the rules incorporate the 
agent’s reasons. If they are subject to change by the arbitrary will of 
others, opportunities are not available in the sense required for long-
term projects. What it means for an individual’s voice to be heard var-
ies considerably by case – it is one thing to have input to legislative 
decision-making and another to make a difference to diffuse cultural 
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value patterns. Little can be said a priori about this. The final, subjec-
tive acceptance condition, points back to the experience of recogni-
tion. The agent must be confident that the rules take her reasons into 
account to be able rely on them and participate wholeheartedly in the 
practice.97
The conditions (a) to (c) delineate in general terms what counts as a 
fair chance with respect to the various analytically distinct goods 
needed to exercise autonomy: social power, cultural resources, per-
sonal relationships and economic resources.98 The difference between 
objective recognition and misrecognition, as well as competitive and 
insufficient material resources, is the difference between meeting them 
and failing to meet them with respect to these goods. Since the condi-
tions incorporate political participation, broadly understood, it cannot 
be said in advance where the lines are to be drawn in particular cases. 
However, we can say that if (a) to (c) are fulfilled for each practice 
within which one acts and lives, the objective social conditions for 
exercising autonomy are met and the agent is aware of this; in short, 
the she is at home in her social world, to use the Hegelian expression. 
She is neither objectively nor subjectively alienated from her surround-
ings. I will summarise these results in a table and then examine briefly 
the Hegelian background of this type of theory.
5.3. Related Views
The historical model for this type of account is Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right, which can be read as an extended argument for the social 
and institutional preconditions of actualising individual freedom, as 
Honneth suggests in his Suffering from Indeterminacy. Hegel begins 
with a commonsense conception of freedom: to be free is to be uncon-
strained or unlimited. But what is it to be unconstrained? Hegel 
mocks those who equate lack of constraint with the mere ability to step 
back from immediate impulses; such abstract conception of freedom is 
a recipe for inaction or blind fury of levelling all the distinctions 
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between people.99 To refuse to will anything particular is not to will at 
all, so talk of free will here must be empty – though the ability to 
abstract from particular contents is indeed an essential component of 
free will, since it is required to transcend determination by arbitrary, 
contingent desires and drives. Freedom that is worth its name must be 
concrete, it must be manifest in particular choices and actualised in the 
objective world. This requires, first, settling on a determinate content 
of the will (forming a particular intention) and, second, carrying out 
99 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §5.
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100 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §7Z.
101 Compare Hegel, Philosophy of Right, §23: “Only in this freedom is the will com-
pletely with itself, because it has reference to nothing but itself, so that every relation-
ship of dependence on something other is thereby eliminated”.
102 Hardimon, “The Project of Reconciliation: Hegel’s Social Philosophy”, 
pp. 173–174. As he sums up the view later, it must be the case both that the social 
world is a home and that people grasp this, feel at home within it, and accept and 
affirm the social world (Hardimon, 1992, p. 181).
103 I have not in any way tried to mirror the complexity of Hegel’s tripartite 
account of abstract right, morality, and (itself internally complex) ethical life, nor have 
this intention through action (realising the end one has set for one-
self). Both steps necessarily bring in limitations to abstract freedom: to 
settle on a goal means ruling out other goals, and action always takes 
place in a social and institutional context that allows some kinds of 
behaviour and rules out other kinds. Hegel’s insight is that not all kinds 
of limitation have the same status: as long as one is (rationally) ‘at 
home’ (bei sich) with the limitation – as long as one identifies with one’s 
goal and the normative framework within which one operates – one is 
not constrained by it, but quite the opposite; the limitations are an 
expression of one’s self. His example of this is friendship and love, 
within which we “willingly limit ourselves with reference to an other, 
even while knowing ourselves in this limitation as ourselves”.100 To be 
free, in other words, is to be constrained only by what one identifies 
with good reason, so that one is after all not determined by something 
external to oneself.101 It is to be reconciled with one’s social environ-
ment. As Michael Hardimon stresses, for Hegel, this involves subjec-
tive acceptance of the practices and their being worthy of it – that is, in 
terms that I have used, the subjective experience of recognition and the 
objective fact of recognition.102 Given the conflicts of interest involved 
in modern social practices like the market and party politics, it may 
not be obvious (even when it is the case) that the normative framework 
expresses their values and takes into account both their individual and 
communal needs, thus enabling rather than restricting freedom. 
In these cases, it is a task of philosophy to help people see this – to see 
the rational in the real, as Hegel famously (or notoriously) put it. 
However, though Hegel’s own inclinations are perhaps conservative, 
nothing in his view precludes the possibility of criticising a social 
arrangement that does, in fact, objectively alienate some of those 
affected by it by making it difficult or impossible for them to exercise 
their autonomy within it – quite the contrary. At this level of abstrac-
tion, at least, the model presented here is clearly Hegelian in spirit.103
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I followed the principles of composition derived from his logic. By beginning my 
account of objective conditions from the various capacities whose exercise they enable, 
I have naturally ended up with a different classification than Hegel’s, which is rather 
based on the various social spheres within which autonomy is exercised: family, civil 
society and the state. The capacities I discuss are exercised within each, though it may 
be true that there is a rough correlation between forms and spheres of recognition 
(that is, love and family, esteem and civil society, respect and state).
104 Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, pp. 28–33 and passim. 
Fraser’s talk of cultural value patterns fits best with my account of the dimensions of 
non-marginalisation and non-exclusion.
105 Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, p. 36.
106 I thus concur with Honneth when he says of Fraser that, “there is something 
inherently arbitrary about her idea of participatory parity” (Fraser and Honneth, 
Redistribution or Recognition?, p. 179) and subscribe to what he calls “teleological lib-
eralism” (p. 178).
In terms of contemporary debates, a strongly intersubjective account 
of autonomy in a Hegelian spirit amounts to an Aufhebung of the dis-
pute between Honneth and Nancy Fraser. I have argued that Fraser is 
correct in separating analytically the wrongs of economic maldistribu-
tion from those of recognition. In arguing for the independent impor-
tance of objective recognition in addition to subjective experience of 
recognition, I have also in effect subscribed to what Fraser calls a “sta-
tus model of recognition”, which construes recognition as a matter of 
institutionalised patterns of cultural value that enable one to partici-
pate as a peer in social life.104 From the Hegelian as well as liberal per-
spective, however, Fraser makes a mistake in displacing autonomy as 
the fundamental deontological normative notion in favour of what she 
calls “parity of participation”, according to which “justice requires 
social arrangements that permit all (adult) members of society to 
interact with one another as peers”.105 The Hegelian view, by contrast, 
sees access to participation in social life as normatively central because 
and to the extent that it is necessary for exercising autonomy. If we 
understand Honneth’s concept of self-realisation to refer to exercis-
ing autonomy, we will thus side with Honneth on the issue of norma-
tive foundations. Indeed, it is difficult to see how one could answer 
the question of why participatory parity is valuable, if not by refer-
ence  to the value of autonomy. No wonder Fraser avoids raising the 
question.106
Another advantage of the Hegelian view is that it recognises and 
incorporates not only the objective but also the psychological condi-
tions for exercising autonomy. Neither Fraser nor Honneth seem to 
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107 See for example Axel Honneth, Leiden an Unbestimmtheit. Eine Reaktualisierung 
der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie, Philipp Reclam, Stuttgart, 2001, pp. 31, 80–81.
108 Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, pp. 258–259.
109 Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, p. 245 (my emphasis).
realise that the status and psychological experience models of recogni-
tion are complementary rather than mutually exclusive. Again, the for-
mer lays out (part of) the social conditions for exercising autonomy, 
while the latter involves empirically important social-psychological 
conditions for the same. Both social status and positive psychological 
self-relation are necessary for exercising autonomy, as I have argued. 
To be sure, Honneth’s position is not as clear-cut as Fraser’s rejection 
of psychological considerations. After all, the subtitle of his Suffering 
from Indeterminacy is “an attempt at a reactualisation of Hegel’s 
Philosophy of Right”, and he clearly recognises the objective and insti-
tutional character of Hegel’s conditions for autonomy. Still, from his 
exposition, it is hard to tell which aspects of his Hegel exegesis Honneth 
actually endorses, and he sometimes adds a reference to how recogni-
tion enables the subject to see or experience him or herself as free, sug-
gesting that in his interpretation the importance of recognition to 
autonomy is mediated by experience after all.107 Both The Struggle for 
Recognition and his contributions to Redistribution or Recognition? are 
unambiguously psychologistic. For example, in his response to Fraser 
he claims that we are interested in a just social order because “it is only 
under these conditions that subjects can attain the most undamaged 
possible self-relation, and thus individual autonomy”108 and that the 
“insufficiencies and deficits” of forms of mutual recognition are “always 
tied to feelings of misrecognition”.109 Thus it is fairly safe to conclude 
that both Honneth and Fraser have a one-sided understanding of the 
double contribution of recognition to making possible the exercise of 
autonomy.
6. Conclusion: Toward a Hegelian Liberalism
In this essay, I have been exploring various conceptions of autonomy 
and assessing them against what I take to be the widely accepted theo-
retical role the concept has, finding that effective autonomy has three 
kinds of social or intersubjective conditions. The core of the concept is 
authentic self-determination. Authentically self-determining agents 
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are fully accountable for their life choices and deserve to be rewarded 
and punished accordingly. This accountability requires that the agents 
are at least moderately responsive to desire-independent reasons and 
so capable of standing back from their immediate inclinations and 
assessing situations in light of standards that are not merely passed on 
through socialisation. I have defended this normative competence 
view as the best account of individual autonomy-constituting capaci-
ties. However, I have also laid out three ways in which the acquisition 
and effective exercise of these capacities, and so being autono-
mous,  depends on a suitable social environment. First, we become 
autonomous only through being taken care of within an autonomy-
supporting culture. Roughly, we learn to understand and recognise 
reasons that go beyond biological needs in and through the process of 
initiation into language that involves qualitative distinctions of value. 
We gain a capacity to imagine living differently by learning about par-
ticular ways of life that are concretely realised in our culture or in the 
past, and learn to control our behaviour accordingly through internal-
ising demands made, to begin with, by concrete, loving authority fig-
ures. Second, as a matter of fact and for the most part, we come to meet 
the psychological conditions for exercising autonomy (or second-order 
psychological capacities for autonomy) like self-confidence, self-
respect and self-esteem only through the experience of being recog-
nised by others, in the context of the family, civil society, and the legal 
and political system. And third, even if we have both kinds of psycho-
logical capacities, we are still not able to lead an autonomous life unless 
the structure of our social environment meets the directly social condi-
tions for exercising autonomy. We must be objectively recognised so 
that the rules of the relevant social practices do not deny us the oppor-
tunity to participate in personal relationships, pursue valuable com-
prehensive goals in a context within which they are meaningful, and 
enjoy guaranteed control over our plans of life. We must also enjoy 
sufficient competitive material resources, lest the opportunities opened 
by objective recognition remain meaningless. In each case, it does not 
suffice that the rules of the practices are accidentally responsive to our 
personal reasons; full exercise of autonomy requires that we have a 
voice in defining what being autonomous amounts to in our particular 
historical and cultural situation. A social world that meets all these 
conditions is a ‘home’ in the Hegelian sense, and insofar as we are 
also aware that it is such, we are at home within it, and so free and 
autonomous. It is unlikely, of course, that all these conditions are ever 
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fully met. However, they, like autonomy itself, are a matter of degree, 
and we can be confident that most adults in contemporary Western 
societies meet them to a sufficient extent to be fit to be held responsible 
for their life choices, so the view does not set the bar for autonomy too 
high. In addition, it helps make sense of locally reduced responsibility. 
When either the psychological or directly social conditions for exercise 
are impaired with regard to a certain set of options, we are and should 
be reluctant to place blame on people for their failures in that regard.
While each of these intersubjective conceptions of autonomy has 
been addressed in the past, a systematic, comprehensive synthesis has 
so far been lacking. All that remains is to sketch how such a conception 
could be normatively fruitful as an internal critique of contemporary 
liberalism and liberal democracy. In doing so, I will adopt as a starting 
point a generic form of liberalism characterised by three basic princi-
ples. First, basic liberties are to be guaranteed to everyone by granting 
rights that trump utilitarian considerations of maximising general wel-
fare. Second, the state is to be maximally neutral between competing 
rights-respecting conceptions of the good. And finally, distributive 
inequalities are acceptable so long as they are consistent with fair 
equality of opportunity, so that the resulting distribution is choice-
sensitive but endowment-insensitive. These principles concretise the 
goal of equally respecting each citizen as a person capable of forming 
and pursuing a conception of good and taking responsibility for her 
choices – in other words, respecting, protecting and promoting every-
one’s autonomy. That is why they are justifiable to everyone in a plural-
istic society where there is no single model of the good life, as long as 
they are reasonable enough not to want to impose such burdens on 
others that they would not themselves accept. I will assume that this 
generic model captures the central ideas of such paradigmatic (non-
utilitarian) liberals as Rawls, Dworkin, Kymlicka and Scanlon, though 
each develops and justifies his view in different ways.
The question then is whether individual rights, state neutrality and 
equal opportunity suffice to respect autonomy in light of its threefold 
social conditions. The issues that Hegelian liberalism raises are for the 
most part familiar from earlier debates around the challenges to stand-
ard liberalism – the hope is simply that the systematic framework 
allows a more perspicuous view and perhaps helps with their resolu-
tion. For example, as we have seen, communitarians, recognition theo-
rists and perfectionists each argue that the existence of a plurality of 
valuable and valued ways of living embedded in cultural practices is 
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110 None of these means really addresses the need for loving parent-child relation-
ships, and there is obviously little one can do to further them. However, since the 
emotional quality is essential for autonomy – including the psychological conditions 
for its exercise, as Honneth stresses – there is also a further autonomy-based argument 
for making available remedial means, such as therapy, for those who have been injured 
in this respect.
111 Anderson and Honneth, “Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice”, 
p. 142.
necessary for autonomy. Taking a closer look though, communitarians 
like Taylor emphasise its importance for developing a capacity to make 
choices; recognition theorists like Honneth stress its role in acquiring 
and maintaining self-esteem; and perfectionists like Raz point out that 
it is necessary for exercising autonomy. These are very different argu-
ments that rely on different kinds of evidence and have potentially dif-
ferent implications for autonomy-respecting policies, though there is 
naturally a significant degree of overlap. To mount an effective chal-
lenge to liberal assumptions, it is essential to have a clear view of these 
differences and the sort of conditions of autonomy they appeal to. 
Here, my goal is simply to indicate some directions for future research 
and possible liberal lines of response.
To begin with the development of first-order capacities, several of 
the empirical intersubjective requirements concern caring parent-
child relationships. Thus they fall on the ‘private’ side of the public/
private distinction, and so, in some traditional liberal views, beyond 
the reach of justice. Insofar as respecting autonomy as an issue of jus-
tice, however, this means there is a potential conflict between the 
child’s rights to the conditions of autonomy and the parents’ rights to 
privacy and continuing a culture across generations. The parents’ 
rights and pragmatic considerations speak against any direct legal reg-
ulation, which would no doubt be counterproductive within the sensi-
tive family dynamic. However, acknowledging the child’s interest 
provides an autonomy-based argument for non-intrusive, indirect 
measures, such as paid maternity and paternity leaves, free child-care 
classes and packages, well-trained and well-paid kindergarten teachers 
in public services, and pluralistic educational materials.110
What about the psychological conditions for the exercise of auton-
omy and their intersubjective requirements? Anderson and Honneth 
claim that accepting the recognitional view signals a “need for signifi-
cant revisions to commitments of (Rawlsian) liberalism”.111 Their main 
arguments seem to boil down to the following: rights are not sufficient 
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112 Anderson and Honneth, “Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice”, 
p. 143. It must be noted that Anderson and Honneth seriously misconstrue Rawls’ 
‘original position’ behind the veil of ignorance in their critique when they claim that 
according to him, participants “should not have knowledge of what people in the soci-
ety are like, except the most basic features of their instrumental rationality” (Anderson 
and Honneth, “Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition, and Justice”, pp. 141–142). On 
the contrary, Rawls argues that the parties know, among other things, “the laws of 
human psychology”, and indeed “whatever general facts affect the choice of principles 
of justice” (Rawls, 1971, p. 137). Rawls himself goes on to give an example in which 
knowledge of moral psychology makes a difference to the principles adopted. 
Importantly, parties in the original position also have conception of primary goods, 
the kind of things that are useful or needed for any rational plan of life, and these 
include self-respect, “perhaps the most important primary good” (Rawls, 1971, 
p. 440). What the parties do not know is their own position in the society they are 
designing and the particular conception of the good they will have.
113 Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, p. 188. The latter argument 
relies at least in part on the mistaken view that economic compensation is rooted in 
cultural valuation.
to guarantee psychological conditions for exercising autonomy, since 
legally enforced esteem and love are not only absurd but also positively 
useless for developing self-trust, and correspondingly “parties in the 
original position need much better understanding of these conditions 
for acquiring self-respect and self-esteem than Rawls equips them 
with”.112 More broadly, they suggest a shift of focus from distributive to 
recognitional concerns. There are only scattered hints in Honneth’s 
work for what this might mean in practice and how it would go beyond 
the sort of legal equality that liberals of all stripes should be willing to 
extend to everyone. He does suggest, however, that progress in the 
sphere of love might amount to “a step-by-step elimination of role-
clichés, stereotypes, and cultural ascriptions that structurally impede 
adaptation to others’ needs” and that in the case of social esteem it 
would involve “radically scrutinizing the cultural constructions that, 
in the industrial-capitalist past, saw to it that only a small circle of 
activities were distinguished as ‘gainful employment’ ”.113 Thus it seems 
that there is no actual conflict with basic liberal tenets of rights and 
neutrality, but rather an emphasis on the need to supplement state 
action with cultural change, for which the recognition view offers eval-
uative criteria that are absent from liberalism.
Finally, the social conditions for exercising autonomy are already a 
battleground between liberals, on the one hand, and perfectionists, 
republicans, communitarians and deliberative democrats on the other, 
even if not always under that heading. Liberal egalitarians do naturally 
address domination and exploitation by insisting on civil and political 
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114 For republicanism, see Philip Pettit, A Theory of Freedom, Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2001, and Q. Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997; for deliberative democracy, J. Habermas, Die Einbeziehung des 
Anderen. Studien zur politischen Theorie, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1996; J. Bohman, 
Public Deliberation. Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy, Cambridge, Mass., MIT 
Press, 1996; Richardson 2002, among many others.
115 See W. Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2002, pp. 286–287. Richardson, 2002 is happily a liberal, a republican and a 
deliberative democrat at the same time!
116 Rawls, 1971, p. 529.
117 Fraser and Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition?, pp. 72–78. She herself pre-
fers the strategy of ‘non-reformist reform’, policies that are affirmative in nature and so 
pragmatically feasible, but “set in motion a trajectory of change in which more radical 
reforms become practicable over time” (Fraser, 2003, p. 79).
118 Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1993, 
p. 33.
rights and fair equality of opportunity. Both republicans and delibera-
tive democrats have challenged the sufficiency of non-interference 
with rights in combating domination, and argued for the importance 
of political participation and access to public deliberation that goes 
beyond aggregation of prepolitical preferences.114 Some liberals, how-
ever, view these theories as supplementing rather than replacing liber-
alism; the issue hangs on the question of the relationship between 
theories of justice and theories of democracy, which has not yet been 
sufficiently addressed.115 On the issue of economic domination, Rawls, 
for example, insists on guaranteeing basic resources for everyone pre-
cisely so that “no one need be servilely dependent on others and made 
to choose between monotonous and routine occupations which are 
deadening to human thought and sensibility.”116 In practice, liberals 
adopt what Fraser terms ‘affirmative’ policies like unemployment 
insurance and income transfers to address inequality instead of ‘trans-
formative’ policies addressing the economic structures that create 
massive inequalities in the first place.117 Whether this is sufficient or 
not is open to much dispute.
As to other aspects of objective recognition, while personal relation-
ships have remained off the radar for liberals, the importance of cul-
tural practices within which to express one’s identity has been a major 
impetus for recent developments in liberalism. For example, Yael 
Tamir’s liberal nationalism is based on ‘contextual individualism’, 
according to which an autonomous person is capable of making 
choices, including constitutive choices of national and cultural iden-
tity, only “because he is situated in a particular social and cultural envi-
ronment that offers him evaluative criteria”.118 She argues that civil 
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119 See, for example, Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, ch. 3–6. Identification with com-
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aspect of Hegelian ‘being at home’.
120 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, pp. 362–365.
121 Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Philosophy, p. 250.
122 See J. Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts 
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rights and liberties are not sufficient for guaranteeing the existence of 
such an environment, so that individuals must be granted rights to 
culture and national self-determination and, as long as they exercise 
them, have special obligations toward their fellow nationals and flour-
ishing of the culture. ‘Nation-building’ through conscious propagation 
of a common language, history, symbols, rituals and customs in schools 
and the media can and often does create an environment within which 
citizens have access to collective goods and develop a sense of belong-
ing and solidarity that lends legitimacy to redistributive policies, for 
example.119 However, this threatens liberal neutrality and places 
minorities and rebels at a disadvantaged position. Some liberals, like 
Will Kymlicka, support special minority rights precisely as a response 
to such majority nation-building.120 Whether such means suffice to 
guarantee provision of valuable alternatives without compromising 
state neutrality is yet another open question. The plausibility of the 
liberal prohibition of value judgements in public action seems to 
depend on seeing ‘the state’ and ‘the political’ as something opposed to 
“groups and associations below the level of the state – friends and fam-
ily … churches, cultural associations, professional groups and trade 
unions, universities, and the mass media”121 to which liberals relegate 
assessing the value of various cultural options. The insight of delibera-
tive democrats is that the purpose of democratic procedures is pre-
cisely to allow for the public opinion formed within such organisations 
of civil society to be channelled into the political sphere and into law.122 
This makes it possible to go beyond liberal neutrality by enlarging the 
options for exercising personal autonomy through the exercise of 
political autonomy.
I have been able to give the merest taste of the debates around the 
social conditions of autonomy within normative political philosophy. 
What are we left with in the end? It seems liberalism is an easy target to 
shoot at, but a hard one to hit. Its commitment to providing everyone 
with the basic goods needed for autonomy gives it a great deal of flex-
ibility in response to conceptions that add more conditions to the 
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list – if something really is necessary for the autonomous pursuit of 
any kind of good life, the liberal will (or at least should) happily adopt 
it. The real issue is whether some of these commitments conflict with 
other core commitments of liberalism, such as those of limiting the 
means to individual legal rights and state neutrality. Here empirical 
questions about which sort of policies best promote the existence of 
autonomy-conducive relationships cannot be avoided, particularly 
since many of them are in principle out of direct reach of legislative 
and administrative means. The kind of Hegelian liberalism I have out-
lined in this essay could help focus such research and justify the result-
ing policy proposals on the basis of the internally complex social 
dimension of autonomy.
